MENTAL vs. Philosophy of Language, of Wittgenstein
28. MENTAL vs. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language
MENTAL vs. WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
"All philosophy is linguistic criticism" (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 4.0031).
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations).
Wittgenstein's Philosophy
Ludwig Wittgenstein −one of the most original and influential philosophers of the 20th century− was a charismatic character who sought to build a unified worldview from a linguistic perspective.
Wittgenstein went through two opposite philosophical stages:
In the first, his thought was reflected in a single work published during his lifetime: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It is a small work (74 pages) published in German in 1921 and in English (with an introduction by Bertrand Russell) in 1922. In it, he tries to found language from a logical point of view, and advocates creating (or discovering) an ideal, perfect and clear (not ambiguous) language to solve all philosophical problems. According to his universalist view, there is an isomorphism between language, thought and reality.
In the second stage, his thought was mainly reflected in his work Philosophical Investigations, published posthumously in 1953. In this work he denies the ideas contained in the Tractatus, affirming that there is no logical language underlying natural languages, and that there are as many languages as there are uses.
Wittgenstein was an original thinker. He drew his thoughts practically from nothing, from his personal reflections, with hardly any reference to the works of previous authors. He lived intensely everything he discovered until he realized that he had reached a limit. It was then that he sensed that beyond that limit was the inexpressible, the transcendent, the "mystical".
The Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations were two works that revolutionized 20th century philosophy. Wittgenstein was a disciple of Bertrand Russell at Trinity College, Cambridge.
The first Wittgenstein
The thought of the first Wittgenstein is reflected in the Tractatus, a very important and influential work, a singular work within the history of philosophy:
It had a special influence on the neopositivist school of the Vienna Circle.
He promoted analytic philosophy, a way of doing philosophy based on the analysis of the language in which philosophical problems are formulated, a current inaugurated by Frege.
According to most authors, Wittgenstein with his Tractatus was the one who gave the "linguistic turn" to philosophy (a term introduced by Richard Rorty in 1990): language as the articulating element of all 20th century philosophy.
The Tractatus is structured in 7 theses, with propositions, aphorisms or short sentences and numbered hierarchically. Thus, for example, proposition 5.621 is an observation, precision, nuance or detail of 5.62, this one of 5.6 and this one of 5.5.
The 7 theses are:
The world is all that is the case.
What is the case, the fact, is the actual giving of state of affairs.
The logical figure of the fact is the thought.
Thought is the proposition with meaning.
The proposition is a veritative function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a veritative function of itself).
The general form of the veritative function is [p, (ξ), N(ξ)]. This is the general form of the proposition.
What cannot be spoken about must be kept silent.
The first thesis starts from the world and the last one ends with the transcendent.
In the sixth thesis, Wittgenstein does not clarify the meaning of the symbolism used. Russell, in his introduction to the English version, clarifies it:
p stands for all elementary propositions.
ξ represents the veritative functions based on combinations of the elementary propositions.
N(ξ) represents the negation of the propositions composing ξ
The second Wittgenstein
The thought of the second Wittgenstein is mainly reflected in his posthumous work Philosophical Investigations, where he disavows the ideas of the Tractatus, stating that:
There is no ideal, profound, essential, absolute and universal logical language, the foundation of ordinary natural language, because a general and unified theory of language is not possible, and because language cannot be conceived as a simple reflection of the logical structure of the world. Nor is it possible to bring out the primary constituents of reality: the logical atoms.
The meaning of a term or expression is not fixed, it is open. It is the historical and social life that determines the language. There are as many languages as there are uses of language. Wittgenstein calls these uses "language games".
Language games belong to a collectivity and never to a single individual. A private language is impossible. Among language games there are "family resemblances".
One of these games is the informative or descriptive aspect, the aspect covered by the Tractatus. But there are many other language games or manifestations of language such as: communicating, questioning, threatening, seducing, asking, choosing, greeting, telling, singing, cursing, thanking, etc., which do not refer to the world.
There is nothing hidden in languages, there is no underlying logic. Logic is just another game among all the other games. Language cannot be reduced to logical structures, but is diverse and multifaceted in uses and functions in creating knowledge and meaning. There is no ideal realm of abstract entities (the logical space).
To ask for the meaning of a word or the sense of a proposition is equivalent to asking how it is used. This language will be a reflection of the way of life of the speakers. "To imagine a language means to imagine a way of life."
Meaning is not to be found in the inner (mental) world of the subject or in any logic underlying the language.
One must understand the world through the analysis of various languages, which offer different perspectives on the world.
There is no perfect order to be discovered but an innumerable dispersion of possible orders.
Philosophical problems are knots created by languages. The mission of philosophy is to fight against the haunting of our understanding by means of language. Philosophy has as its vision to detect and show those bewitchments or perplexities caused by languages, and not to explain, deduce or infer. It is not to explain, deduce or infer, but to "think not, but look", meaning that it is only necessary to observe how ordinary language is used.
It is grammar, and not logic, that establishes which use of language is endowed with meaning and which is not.
Language use is governed by rules. There are many kinds of rules. Even the concept of rule is not fixed, for there are many meanings of the word rule. There is no transcendental grammar or common or general essence of rules. Rules are contingent, like the facts of the world. The rules only maintain a certain "air of family" among themselves. Rules constitute a set, not a system.
A proposition is absurd or meaningless when it is used outside its own set of language.
For the first Wittgenstein, truth is the correspondence between the sense of what is represented by a proposition and a fact of the world. For the second Wittgenstein, this correspondence criterion is restricted only to descriptive language.
In the Tractatus, the meaning of a name is the object it names, i.e., its reference. For the second Wittgenstein, names are not mere labels to be applied to objects, but instruments that fulfill functions of quite different kinds. The referential criterion of meaning is replaced by the pragmatic criterion of meaning.
With these ideas, Wittgenstein abandons the deep, absolute, logical point of view for grounding and analyzing language, and adopts a superficial, relative, pragmatic point of view.
MENTAL vs. Tractatus
The Tractatus is a complex, ambiguous and cryptic text. Its content is synthetic, poorly developed, and therefore lends itself to various interpretations.
Wittgenstein himself admitted that his work might not be understood. "Possibly only those will understand this book who have ever thought for themselves the thoughts expressed in it or similar thoughts" (from the Foreword to the Tractatus). In fact, even Bertrand Russell, his mentor, did not interpret it correctly when he wrote the foreword to the work in its English version, Wittgenstein claimed.
The Tractatus is not even a theory of language, but a loose, loosely structured (despite its numerical coding) and underdeveloped set of reflections. Wittgenstein pursued a universal paradigm, a unified theory of the world based on the common essence of language, thought and reality. But he failed to specify exactly what that common essence was. He only pointed to logic as the foundation of everything, but without clarifying or specifying the logical primitives (or "logical atoms") and their relations.
There is an analogy between Wittgenstein's Tractatus and MENTAL. Wittgenstein elaborated his reflections starting from practically nothing. MENTAL has also been created from scratch as a result of questioning the principles and foundations of everything, and of the search for primary universals (the simplest ones) and their manifestation at the linguistic level. This justifies the comparison between the two systems.
Let us now compare the philosophy of the Tractatus with the philosophy of MENTAL, thematically, referring to the most significant sentences of Wittgenstein's text.
Reality
Facts.
→ Tractatus
"The world is all that is the case" (1).
"The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (1.1).
"The state of affairs is a connection of objects (things)" (2.01).
"Being able to be integral to a state of things is essential to the thing" (2.011).
"Just as we absolutely cannot represent objects outside of space, nor temporal objects outside of time, so we cannot represent any object outside of the possibility of its connection with others" (2.0121).
→ MENTAL
The concept of "fact" is very important in Wittgenstein's philosophy and in the whole neopositivist movement. Wittgenstein claims that the world is composed of facts, not things, and that facts are connections or relations between things. Nothing exists without relation to other things. The facts of the world are relations. The thing itself is unknowable, independent of the fact in which it appears, but we can know the relations.
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy, religion, art and ethics can say nothing about facts. Only natural science can speak about the facts of reality.
Types of facts.
→ Tractatus
According to Wittgenstein, there are atomic and molecular facts:
Atomic facts (or "states of affairs") are those which define the essence of the world. They are described by atomic or elementary propositions. An atomic fact cannot be decomposed into simpler facts.
Molecular (or compound) facts derive from the combination of atomic facts. They are described by molecular propositions.
Wittgenstein gave no example of either an atomic fact or an atomic proposition. Various interpretations have been given to atomic facts:
They are hypothetical logical facts: the primary logical constituents of reality.
They are the objects, but not the physical objects of the world, but simple entities irreducible to simpler entities.
They are, in their simplest form, monadic relations formed by an object and a predicate, but in their most general form they are polyadic relations, that is, between several objects.
→ MENTAL
From the MENTAL paradigm we can contemplate the three previous interpretations:
The primary constituents of reality are not the logical atoms, but the archetypes of consciousness.
The simplest and most irreducible objects are the characters.
The simplest relations are expressions involving only one primitive, such as {a b c}, and molecular facts are those involving more than one primitive, such as {a b c}/u.
In MENTAL, possible facts are specified by expressions, which reside in abstract space. Expressions are related to each other. In fact, an expression is a structure of relations. The relations create the abstract space. Even the entire abstract space where expressions are stored can be considered an expression. It is not possible to represent anything without establishing relations. Relations are manifestations of the primary archetypes.
Relationships between facts.
→ Tractatus
"From the actual giving or non-giving of one state of affairs, the actual giving or non-giving of another cannot be deduced" (2.062).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, between atomic facts (states of affairs) there is no logical link. Facts are superimposed on one another. From the existence of one fact one cannot logically deduce the existence of another. And elementary propositions are logically independent of each other.
In MENTAL there are relations of all kinds among expressions: causal, shared, linked, etc.
World vs. Reality.
→ Tractatus
"The world is all that is the case" (1.1).
"The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13).
"The world is decomposed into facts" (1.2).
"The total reality is the world" (2.063).
"The specification of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely" (4.26).
→ MENTAL
The concept of "world" is one of the main components of the Tractatus, along with those of language, figure, thought, and reality. Wittgenstein does not clarify what is the difference between world and reality. On the one hand he says that the world is the totality of facts, which are described by true elementary propositions. But, on the other hand, he says that the proposition is a figure (representation) of reality. Since there are propositions that refer to the world and propositions that do not, it follows that reality is the totality of what is possible. Here we are going to suppose or admit that reality is the set of possible facts, and to which correspond the set of propositions with meaning. Reality is formed by the set of existing facts and the set of non-existent but possible facts. Reality is the totality of the possible. The world is a part of reality: the set of existing facts. The propositions corresponding to these facts are true.
In MENTAL reality is the set of possible worlds, which is equivalent to the set of possible expressions.
Object.
→ Tractatus
"Objects are simple" (2.02).
"Objects form the substance of the world, therefore they cannot be compound" (2.021).
"Objects can only be named. Signs take the place of them, I cannot express them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is" (3.221).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, we cannot know what objects are, we cannot analyze them; we can only name them (assign them a name).
To the objects of the world (or of reality) correspond elements of propositions, which are the names, their referents. There are elements of propositions that have no referent, such as logical and mathematical operators.
In MENTAL, the simplest entities (expressions) are characters, which constitute the "substance" of abstract space: digits, letters, and special characters, including the symbols of primary archetypes.
Internal properties.
→ Tractatus
"In order to know an object, I certainly do not have to know its external properties, but I must know all its internal properties" (2.01231).
"A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object does not possess it" (4.123).
"An internal property of a fact we may also call a feature of that fact" (4.1221).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, objects have a logical nature determined by their internal (or essential) properties. An internal property of an object is one that it must necessarily have. The relations involved in a fact are delimited by the internal properties of objects. It is precisely the relations between internal properties of objects that make some propositions meaningful and others not.
In MENTAL, a property of an expression is internal (or intrinsic) if it follows from the expression itself. For example, the sequence (a b c) has the intrinsic property of having 3 elements. An external or extrinsic property of an expression is a property assigned externally to that expression. For example, x/V (x has the property of being true).
Logic
Basis.
→ Tractatus
"Logic is transcendental" (6.13).
→ MENTAL
Wittgenstein intuited that there must be something fundamental and profound that grounds reality, thought, and language, and he identified it with logic. But the foundation of everything is the primary archetypes (archetypes of consciousness), which are also philosophical categories and universal semantic primitives. Logic is not sufficient to ground internal and external reality. Logic is only one of the primary archetypes and is represented by the primitive "Condition".
Logic is a priori.
→ Tractatus
"Logic is before all experience −that something is so. It is before the how, not before the what" (5.552).
→ MENTAL
Logic is prior to all experience. And also the primary archetypes are a priori, prior to all experience.
The illogical.
→ Tractatus
"That logic is a priori consists in the fact that nothing illogical can be thought" (5.4731).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, nothing that cannot be specified with the primary archetypes can be imagined or thought.
Logical isomorphism between language, thought and reality.
→ Tractatus
"The general form of the proposition is the essence of the proposition" (5.471).
"To give the essence of the proposition means to give the essence of all description, that is, the essence of the world" (5.4711).
"A thought is a proposition with meaning" (4).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is the structure or framework present in every proposition, in every thought and in the world. There is isomorphism between language, thought and reality. They all share the same logical structure. Every particular is a manifestation of the universal, of the essence of the world, which is logic. Inner world (thought), outer world (reality) and language (which connects both worlds) have the same logical structure.
In MENTAL there is a common structure to language, thought and reality, which are the primary archetypes. Inner world and outer world share the same primary archetypes. Thanks to this, the world is intelligible. Language, thought and reality are manifestations of the same primary archetypes. Reality follows the principle of supreme simplicity and the principle of Occam's razor.
In MENTAL, every expression of language is a manifestation of the primary archetypes, and every expression not only reflects the essence of reality, but this essence is the support of the expression. As every expression is constructed by means of primary archetypes, which are deep, every expression (superficial) refers to the deep, establishing a vertical connection between the superficial and the deep.
Limits of logic.
→ Tractatus
"Logic fills the world; the limits of the world are also its limits" (5.61).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is present in everything, fills everything, because everything is grounded in logic. In MENTAL the primary archetypes are present in everything. They constitute the limit or boundary between the rational (or expressible) and the irrational, mystical or ineffable.
Modus ponens.
→ Tractatus
"Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs (and the modus ponens cannot be expressed by a proposition)" (6.1264).
"The description of the general form of the proposition is the description of the one and only general primitive sign of logic" (5.472).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is the structure of every proposition, and if logic is based on the modus ponens, it is not seen how to ground everything only with such a rule.
Tautologies.
→ Tractatus
"The propositions of logic are tautologies" (6.1).
"The proposition shows what it says; tautology and contradiction, which say nothing. Tautology lacks veritative possibilities, since it is unconditionally true; and contradiction is not true under any condition. Tautology and contradiction are meaningless (like the point from which two arrows start in opposite directions)" (4.461).
"That the propositions of logic are tautologies is something that shows the logical properties of language, of the world" (6.12).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, tautologies say nothing about the world. They say nothing that experience can confirm or reject. They only show structural properties within the realm of logic itself.
In MENTAL the primary archetypes constitute the Magna Carta of possible worlds. Their properties are relations between expressions of the primary archetypes, without any reference to the world. And these relations are universally valid. They are tautologies.
Logical space.
→ Tractatus
"The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logical space is the place where propositions reflecting the logical structure of the facts of the world are stored and related.
The equivalent of logical space in MENTAL is what we call "abstract space", the space where expressions and their relations reside. The relations are what create the abstract space. Every expression has existence because it has a relation with other expressions.
The abstract space is a universal space where expressions are stored. From this space derive all possible particular or less general spaces, such as Euclidean spaces, non-Euclidean spaces, etc.
Expression of logic.
→ Tractatus
"It is clear: logical laws cannot themselves be subject to logical laws" (6.123).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, the primary archetypes cannot be expressed. We can only express their manifestations.
Possibilities of logic.
→ Tractatus
"Logic deals with any possibility and all possibilities are its facts" (2.0121).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is the foundation of the expressible and the possible. And all expressive possibilities are the facts of logic. That is, there are facts of the world and facts of logic. Outside of logic it is not possible to express anything.
In MENTAL, all possibilities are based on the primary archetypes and their combinatorics. There are infinite possibilities of manifestation of the primary archetypes. These possibilities can be considered facts in the realm of possible worlds. The totality of possible expressions is symbolized by .
Logic is self-sufficient.
→ Tractatus
"Logic must take care of itself" (5.473).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is self-sufficient, it is autonomous. In MENTAL, the primary archetypes are self-sufficient and do not depend on anything deeper. The primary archetypes support each other. This is the bootstrap philosophy.
Theory.
→ Tractatus
"Logic is not a theory, but a specular figure of the world" (6.13).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, logic is not a theory, because a theory is something speculative. Logic is a representation of the structure of the world. The primitives of MENTAL are not to be considered a theory either, but a reflection of the structure of internal and external reality.
Simplicity.
→ Tractatus
"Solutions to logical problems are to be simple, since they impose the standard of simplicity" (5.4541).
→ MENTAL
Here we interpret Wittgenstein that, since logic is the deepest thing there is, it must be the simplest thing there is. For if it were not simple, it could not constitute the foundation of everything because it would depend on something still simpler. Therefore, all logical problems must be easily solved by being based on the simple concepts of logic.
The same is true of the primary archetypes, which are simple, and anything that is constructed by combinatorics of the primary archetypes is easily constructed, although the result may become complex.
Philosophy
Philosophy vs. natural sciences.
→ Tractatus
"Philosophy is none of the natural sciences (the word 'philosophy' is to mean something above or below, but not next to, the natural sciences)" (4.111).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is neither a science nor is it the first science, for only science speaks meaningfully of the world.
Indeed, philosophy does not belong to the physical world. Philosophy seeks the primary categories of reality to ground everything: the natural world and the possible worlds.
Throughout history there have been many proposals to establish a coherent and structured set of categories. In MENTAL, not only is a set of philosophical categories proposed, but these categories are structured as language. In MENTAL, lexical semantics (the primary categories) is equal to structural semantics (the combinatorics of the same primary categories).
The goal of philosophy.
→ Tractatus
"All philosophy is linguistic criticism" (4.0031).
"The aim of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a doctrine, but an activity" (4.112).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is an analytical and critical praxis of language. The philosophical ideal must seek clarity. Philosophy is not a positive corpus of knowledge, but an intellectual activity consisting in the logical clarification of language.
But the goal of philosophy must be the search for the primary categories of reality, on which everything is based. And to work in philosophy implies also to deepen on oneself, because in us are also the primary categories (the archetypes of the consciousness).
Once these primary categories are found, all problems (philosophical and those of the sciences) are clarified, resolved or simplified. Philosophy does not clarify thoughts, but founds them. They are born already clarified. One does not do "philosophy of language", but one considers that language is born of philosophy, specifically of philosophical categories and their combinatorics.
Problems.
→ Tractatus
"It is not problems of natural science that are to be solved" (6.4312).
→ MENTAL
Indeed, the problems of natural science are superficial. The main problem, the essential problem, is the search for the foundations of all things: the primary categories, their relations and their language. Once this fundamental problem is solved, the rest of the problems are clarified, solved or simplified.
Language
Concept of language.
→ Tractatus
"The totality of propositions is language" (4.001).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, the totality of possible utterances is language. Since they are infinite, language is described, not by a concrete grammar, but by its degrees of freedom: the archetypes of consciousness.
Proposition.
→ Tractatus
"The proposition is the description of a state of affairs" (4.023).
"A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is" (3.221).
"Logical propositions describe the framework of the world or, rather, represent it" (6.124).
"The simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the effective dares of a state of affairs" (4.21).
→ MENTAL
For Wittgenstein, the concept of proposition is limited to the "state of affairs," i.e., to the facts of the world, although there are propositions that refer to possible situations.
In MENTAL, an expression refers to possible worlds or possible expressions. An expression acquires meaning through primary archetypes.
Types of propositions.
→ Tractatus
According to Wittgenstein, there are several types of propositions:
Meaningful propositions. They describe possible facts about the world. They can be true or false.
Nonsense propositions or pseudo-propositions. They are neither true nor false because they do not refer to possible facts of the world, like the propositions of mathematics.
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, a meaningful expression is a syntactically correct (well-formed) expression, whether or not it corresponds to the world. When an expression refers to the world, it can be true or false. If it does not refer to the world, it is neither true nor false. Truth or falsity are attributes that become meaningful when applied to expressions that refer to the world. To specify that an expression x is true is done with the qualifier V (true): x/V, and if it is false with x/F.
Truth functions.
→ Tractatus
"The proposition is a veritative function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a veritative function of itself)" (5).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, there are intrinsic and extrinsic truths. An intrinsic truth is refers to intrinsic or internal properties of an expression. For example, the expression (a b c) is a sequence of length 3: ((a b c)# = 3).
An extrinsic truth of an expression x is one that refers to the world and can be true or false. It is specified by the truth value qualifier: x/V or x/F. When the components of an expression x are assigned a truth value, the truth value of x may or may not be a function of the truth values of its components, depending on the logical relationships between them.
Value of propositions.
→ Tractatus
"All propositions are worth the same" (6.4).
→ MENTAL
Here we interpret that for Wittgenstein, all propositions are worth the same because they are all superficial, they emerge from the deep or transcendental level (logic), which is where their real value resides. And also all propositions are worth the same because they are descriptions of possible facts, all of which are equally contingent (they may or may not occur) and among which there is no preeminence whatsoever.
In MENTAL, all expressions have the same qualitative value, in the sense that they all emerge from the same deep level: the archetypes of consciousness. On a quantitative level they differ in degree of complexity (or simplicity), according to the levels of primary archetypes used.
Limits of language.
→ Tractatus "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (5.6).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, the limits of language and possible worlds are marked by a boundary that delimits the expressible: the primary archetypes (or philosophical categories) and their infinite combinatory possibilities.
Identity.
→ Tractatus
"It is evident that identity is not a relation between objects" (5.5301).
"It is absurd to say of two things that they are identical, and to say of one that it is identical with itself says absolutely nothing" (5.5303).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL the identity is to express that two different expressions refer to the same entity. For example, x+y ≡ y+x (commutative law of addition).
Semantics.
→ Tractatus
"In the proposition comes included the form of its sense, but not its content" (3.13).
"The proposition cannot represent the logical form. In order to be able to represent the logical form, we should place ourselves with the proposition outside logic, that is, outside the world" (4.12).
"The proposition cannot represent the logical form; the latter is reflected in it. Language cannot represent what is reflected in it. What is expressed in language cannot be expressed by us through it." The proposition shows the logical form of reality. It flaunts it" (4.121).
→ MENTAL
Language cannot express its own semantics because a proposition is superficial and semantics is at a deep level, and from the superficial one cannot access the deep.
In MENTAL, expressions are encoded by the signs/symbols of the primary archetypes, which refer to the corresponding semantics. But expressions cannot describe their own semantics, but show their usage on a practical or surface level.
Type theory.
→ Tractatus
"No proposition can state anything about itself, since the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (this is what the 'theory of types' consists in)" (3.332).
→ MENTAL
Type theory is not necessary in MENTAL. When an expression references itself, what is produced is a fractal expression. So an expression can refer to itself. For example, (s =: s/F) (this statement is false).
Names.
→ Tractatus
"The name can no longer be decomposed by any definition: it is a primitive sign" (3.26).
→ MENTAL
For Wittgenstein, names are simple propositional signs. A name refers to an object in the world, but does not describe it. It is like a label applied to the object. Names are conventional and in isolation have no sense (meaning). The only thing that has meaning is the relation between names, that is, semantics resides in the relations between names, when they appear in propositions.
In MENTAL, a name is a sequence of letters and/or digits, the first character being a letter. A name is a label applied, not only to an object, but to any expression, and which allows it to be referenced.
Variables.
→ Tractatus
"The propositional variable designates the formal concept, and its values, the objects falling under this concept" (4.127).
"Every variable is the sign of a formal concept. For every variable represents a constant form possessed by all its values and can be conceived as a formal property of these values" (4.1271).
→ MENTAL
In MENTAL, a variable can represent any expression, and can dynamically refer to any type of expression.
Generalized propositions.
→ Tractatus
"It is possible to describe the world completely by means of entirely generalized propositions" (5.526).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, it is not necessary to describe the world by means of all particular propositions, but it is possible to describe them compactly by means of generalized propositions.
In MENTAL, generic expressions make it possible to describe categories of concrete expressions, and even categories of generic expressions.
Expression.
→ Tractatus
"Any part of the proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol). (The proposition itself is an expression). Expression is everything that, essential for the sense of the proposition, propositions can have in common among themselves. The expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31).
→ MENTAL
Wittgenstein calls "expression" the minimal unit of meaning, and that an expression has form and content. In MENTAL we do not speak of propositions, but of expressions in general, which are in turn constituted by expressions (subexpressions) and so on, until we reach the atomic expressions (the characters).
Figure (Bild).
→ Tractatus
"The figure represents the state of affairs in logical space, the actual giving and not-giving of states of affairs" (2.11).
"The figure is a model of reality" (2.12).
"To objects correspond in the figure the elements of the figure" (2.13).
"The elements of the figure do in it the times of the objects" (2.131).
"The figure consists in its elements being interrelated in a certain way and manner" (2.14).
"Figure is a fact" (2.141).
"The figure can figure any reality whose form it has. The special figure, everything spatial, the chromatic, everything chromatic, and so on" (2.171).
"But the figure cannot figure its form of figuration; it flaunts it" (2.172).
"A logical figure of fact is a thought" (3).
"'A state of affairs is thinkable' means: we can make a figure of it" (3.001).
"The totality of true thoughts is a figure of the world" (3.01).
"Tautology and contradiction are not figures of reality. They do not represent any state of affairs" (4.462).
→ MENTAL
The German word "bild" translates as figure, image, or picture. Since Wittgenstein states that a proposition is a figure of reality, we can translate "bild" as representation, map or model. So we can say that a proposition is a representation of an aspect of reality.
A representation is a reality that replaces, imitates or reflects another. A painting is a representation of a landscape. A portrait is a representation of a person. A score is a representation of a musical composition, etc.
The concept of figure is central to the Tractatus. In fact, the theory is called the "figurative or pictorial theory of meaning," where language is an isomorphic representation or model of the world. Although, according to Wittgenstein, his theory of language is not strictly a theory, but a doing, and that this doing is the only possible philosophy.
In a figure, the representation has the same form as what is represented; they are isomorphic. To each represented element corresponds an element of the representation, and to each represented relation corresponds a relation of the representation. The components of reality are the objects. The components of the figure are called elements.
Language is a map of reality. It is not reality, but a formal level (or formal representation) of reality. We must not confuse the map with the territory, as Korzybski said.
Language, thought and reality are isomorphic. The correspondences are the following:
Level
Basis
Components
Reality
facts
objects
Thought
figures
elements
Language
propositions
nouns
From Wittgenstein's sentences, we can establish the following features of the figure:
To each fact corresponds a figure.
A proposition is a figure of reality: a sensible representation of the logical figure expressed by means of signs (propositional signs).
A figure is a fact, but not a fact of the world, but a fact in logical space, a logical fact. The elements of the figure are objects of logical space.
Logical space is formed by the logical structure of figures.
A figure cannot refer to itself.
A figure is not a proposition. Therefore, its truth or falsity cannot be asserted.
A figure applies not only to facts, but to any reality that has form.
The propositional sign is also a fact. And being a fact, it has an associated figure.
A figure cannot be represented by another figure.
When we perceive an (external) fact, we create internally a thought, model or representation, which is the figure of that fact. That figure will later become a proposition to describe that fact.
Thinking
Concept.
→ Tractatus
In the Tractatus there are at least three descriptions of what thought is:
"A logical figure of facts is a thought" (3).
"A propositional sign, applied and thought, is a thought" (3.5).
"A thought is a proposition with meaning" (4).
In his Philosophical Journal, Wittgenstein states, "Thought is a kind of language."
→ MENTAL
Thought is a mental (internal) activity and cannot be defined or discovered from the mind itself. It is not a meaningful proposition because the proposition is a manifestation of thought. Nor does it have to do only with logical structure. Logic is only one aspect of thought. Nor does it have to do with propositional signs, but with archetypes.
The possible.
→ Tractatus
"Thought contains the possibility of the state of things it thinks. That which is thinkable is also possible" (3.02).
→ MENTAL
Wittgenstein, with this sentence, makes possibility and thought equivalent. In MENTAL, since the mind has degrees of freedom, which are the primary archetypes, everything thinkable is expressible and possible as made in some possible world.
'
Mathematics
Mathematics vs. Logic.
→ Tractatus
"Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, i.e., pseudopropositions" (6.2).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, mathematics is grounded in and derived from logic. This is logicism, a philosophy inaugurated by Frege and followed by Russell and Wittgenstein.
But mathematics does not derive from logic. Mathematics derives from primary archetypes, including the primitive logic (Condition). And mathematical expressions are not just equations. There are sets, functions, rules, equivalences, procedures, etc. Mathematical expressions establish relationships and have meaning. They are not pseudo-propositions. They are expressions that refer to something more important and deeper than the world: possible worlds.
Tautologies.
→ Tractatus
"The mathematical proposition expresses no thought" (6.21).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are like the tautologies of logic, they say nothing about reality. They are also tautologies. The expressions of logic and mathematics are grammatical rules. They are not descriptions of any reality.
Tautologies of logic are universally valid for all possible truth values (true or false) of propositional variables. There are mathematical propositions that are analogous to tautologies of logic, in the sense that they are universally valid expressions, regardless of the specific values of the variables involved in the expression. For example, x+y ≡ y+x is a universally valid expression, independently of the values of x and y.
In MENTAL, universally valid mathematical propositions are parameterized generic expressions.
The mystical
The meaning of the world.
→ Tractatus
"The sense of the physical world has to reside outside of it" (6.41).
→ MENTAL
Indeed, everything must be grounded from a higher level. A discipline cannot ground itself. A world cannot ground itself. MENTAL is grounded in the primary categories, which are transcendental.
Subject and world.
"The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world" (5.632).
→ MENTAL
The subject (the human mind) is capable of imagining all possible worlds. The model of the mind is of the primary archetypes. The subject is the boundary between the physical world and the possible worlds because it contains within itself all possible worlds through the degrees of freedom of the mind which are the primary archetypes.
The mystical.
"The inexpressible certainly exists, it shows itself, it is the mystical" (6.522).
"To feel the world as a limited whole is the mystical" (6.45).
"Not how the world is what is mystical but what it is" (6.44).
"What cannot be spoken of must be kept silent" (7).
→ MENTAL
According to Wittgenstein, the mystical is that which is not expressible, that is, the true deep nature of things. It is not a cognitive experience. The mystical exists and shows itself.
In MENTAL, what can be expressed is delimited by the primary archetypes. If something cannot be expressed in this way, the only recourse is to show it, so that it can only be perceived, not analyzed. The mystical are the primary archetypes themselves (the "what"), which are inexpressible. Only their manifestations (the "how") are expressible.
But to be silent is not only to stop talking, but also to stop thinking. It is about transcending the mind, the expressible. We can only perceive and intuit, but not analyze.
Conclusions
In the light of the MENTAL paradigm we can affirm that the cryptic code of the Tractatus is clarified or "deciphered" to a great extent. And we come to the conclusion that everything is simpler and more direct than what Wittgenstein conceived, because the foundation of everything must necessarily be simple. MENTAL is the simple alternative to Wittgenstein's complex and obscure theory. Moreover, MENTAL is a formally defined universal language, a language of consciousness that unites theory and practice as two aspects of one and the same thing.
Wittgenstein makes no reference at any point to the subject of consciousness. In MENTAL, consciousness is the foundation of everything and is represented by the primary archetypes. Rather than a "linguistic turn" in philosophy, we should speak of a "consciential turn," and not only in philosophy, but in everything. MENTAL is a theory of everything based on archetypes of consciousness.
Wittgenstein wanted to rely on logic as the foundation of everything, and on logical atoms as the fundamental or primary logical constituents of reality. But the primary constituents of reality (internal and external) are the philosophical categories or primary archetypes (or archetypes of consciousness).
MENTAL is the mother language of all particular or less general languages. It is the key that allows reality to be comprehensible. And reality is comprehensible because internal and external reality share the same primary archetypes. We perceive reality with "our categories of understanding" (as Kant said) and because reality is constructed with the same categories. Language is the sensible manifestation of the primary categories. It is as simple as that.
Correspondences Tractatus - MENTAL
Aspect
Tractatus
MENTAL
Foundation
Logic
Archetypes primary
Sentences of language
Propositions
Expressions
Elementary propositions
Nouns
Natural names and numbers
Space
Logical space
Abstract space
Representation
Figure
Structure
Philosophy and language
Philosophy a posteriori of language
Philosophy a priori. Language arises from the primary categories
Ideal language
Undefined
Defined (philosophical language).
The inexpressible
The mystical
The inexpressible (including one's own primary archetypes)
True/false
Applicable to meaningful propositions
Applicable as an explicit attribute to expressions
The harmonization of the two Wittgenstein
In the opinion of the author of this work, the first Wittgenstein was closer to the truth. There is an absolute and universal language based on primary archetypes, one of which is the primitive logic "Condition."
However, it would be a matter of harmonizing the two positions. The apparently opposing positions between the two Wittgensteins are compatible if one admits that:
There is a deep language common to all natural languages, although it is not of a logical type, but based on primary archetypes (archetypes of consciousness).
Language games are manifestations of that common and absolute deep language, but assigning different interpretations to the names used. For example, an expression such as {a b c}, may have different interpretations or "uses", but they all refer to their common essence, which is their form or structure (their "figure", in Wittgenstein's terminology). In the case of the example, its form is that of a set consisting of three elements.
The theses of MENTAL
Following the analogy of the Tractatus, we can establish the following theses of MENTAL:
Reality, at its deepest level, is abstract and is constituted by possible worlds.
Possible worlds, thought and language share the same primary archetypes, the archetypes of consciousness or primary categories.
In possible worlds it is fulfilled: Ontology = Epistemology.
Primary categories are structured in a universal language based on expressions, where it is fulfilled: Lexical semantics = Structural semantics.
There are 12 primary categories and their opposites or duals, which are dimensions or degrees of freedom.
The primary categories constitute the limit of reality. The primary categories themselves are inexpressible. Only their manifestations are expressible.
