"Naive realism is the starting point of all the sciences, especially the natural sciences" (Einstein).
"For consciousness, the existence of appearance is reality" (John Searle).
"All science is nothing more than the refinement of everyday thought" (Eistein).
The Naive Attitude
The naive attitude is an innocent, simple, direct attitude, without a priori conceptions, which seeks the essence of things, the most natural and intuitive explanation or foundation. This attitude leads to the truth, to the conscience and to the deep, where simplicity, power and wisdom reside.
Characteristics of the naive attitude:
It is founded on the conviction of the simplicity of all things. It considers that the simple is the profound. And that the complexity we see in the world is only apparent.
It is also based on the unity of all things. And that the internal and external worlds share the same essential principles or archetypes common to all things.
This is the one we should always adopt as a primary attitude, before considering more complex alternatives.
It is a consciousness of freedom, without restrictions of a rational mental type.
It leads to consider that the apparent is the true, that what we perceive is reality. Although there is always a natural mechanism of inductive type of generalization or abstraction. This mechanism allows us to pass directly from the particular to the general, from the concrete to the abstract. Naive inductivism is an intuitive mechanism by which we abstract or generalize a phenomenon.
It is a very powerful weapon for solving problems. By looking at problems in a straightforward, uncomplicated way, problems do not appear, they are clarified, dissolved or transcended.
It facilitates access to pure consciousness, the field of all possibilities, the source of all creation, where supreme creativity resides.
Unites science and humanism.
Considers that the most immediate concepts are the truest, those that have not passed through the filter of rational analysis.
Perceives reality from being. The mind can be an obstacle to seeing things clearly. Use the mind, but in its purest possible state.
The naive attitude is different from Occam's razor principle. The naive attitude is an a priori attitude, where one accepts the intuitive, the most direct thing that comes to mind, without analyzing it. It seeks synthesis, consciousness, the fundamental, the simple, not analysis. The simplest is the most fundamental. In contrast, the principle of Occam's razor requires examining and analyzing all possible alternatives, and then choosing the simplest, a posteriori.
Naive realism
Naive realism, also known as direct realism, is a philosophy of mind that asserts that things exist independently of consciousness and that they are exactly as we perceive them and as we conceive them. It does not even consider the possibility of an alternative or different reality. The subject is considered a faithful reflection of the external world and is merely passive. This realism is typical of the child, the primitive man and the common man who accept what they see, without discussion.
Things really exist, independently of consciousness and of the subject who knows them. Objects exist independently of being observed and retain their properties when they are not observed.
We can know objects through the senses. Knowledge is an exact reproduction of reality. It is to accept reality as it is perceived, directly and passively, without mental elaboration or rationalization. When something is reflected upon, it ceases to be naive realism.
Knowledge is possible without supposing that consciousness imposes on reality certain concepts or a priori categories.
It is a passive philosophy, of "not doing", of not conditioning consciousness with analysis or reasoning.
Truth consists in the correspondence between the internal mental world and the external physical world.
It is identified with philosophical naturalism in the sense that the starting point is the existence of nature.
There is an abstraction of perception (or of the perceived fact), but it is of a natural type, which is ascending, since every perception is logically ascribed to a category. For example, if we see a group of people, the natural abstraction implies the concept of group, whose components can be of another type. And if we see a green object, we consider it to be a particular instance of color. This bottom-up process can continue. For example, in the case of color, we can consider it to be a particular case of attribute. The process can continue until we reach the ultimate categories of reality.
Naive physics is an intuitive understanding that all humans have about objects in the physical world. This type of physics, however, is only valid for the macroscopic world, because quantum physics defies common sense, since properties depend on the way we observe them. Bertrand Russell, in his work "Meaning and Truth" [1983], states:
"We all start from naive realism, that is, the doctrine that things are what they appear to be. We believe that grass is green, stones are hard, and snow is cold. However, physics assures us that the greenness of the grass, the hardness of the stones and the coldness of the snow are not the greenness, hardness and coldness that we know from our own experience, but something quite different. The observer, thinking that he is in front of a stone, actually observes if we are to believe physics, that is, the effects of the stone on him. Science is thus at war with itself: the more objective it pretends to be, the deeper it sinks into subjectivity, contrary to its own desires. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if authentic, shows that naive realism is false. Consequently, naive realism, if true is false. Therefore, it is false."
Searle and naive realism
John Searle −philosopher of language, mind, and consciousness− is a strong advocate of naive realism:
First, he defends external realism, that is, he holds that there is an external reality independent of us and our internal mental representations. External realism is justified by a single argument: the existence of human language, which makes the intelligibility of reality possible. External realism is neither a theory nor a thesis or hypothesis, but the condition or foundation of there being certain kinds of thesis or hypothesis.
One component of his realist position is his support for naive realism: in all perception things are presented directly as they are. There is no difference between appearance and reality.
He extends naive realism to mental states. "As far as mental states are concerned, they have the properties they appear to have, because in general for such properties there is no distinction between how things are and how they appear" [Searle, 1984].
He relates naive realism to consciousness: "In the case of consciousness, the only reality is appearance." That is: the properties of mental states are real insofar as they appear to consciousness, that is, they are real because we are immediately aware of them.
Naive realism is the best of all possible alternatives for explaining perception and the only one that escapes the objections of skepticism.
Naive realism cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration implies rationality. And naive realism goes beyond rationality.
It makes naive realism and conceptual relativism compatible. First we grasp reality as it is (naive realism) and then we conceptualize it according to the theoretical framework in which we place ourselves (conceptual relativity).
Truth is a state of correspondence with the facts of reality.
It does not admit any form of dualism. There is only one reality, but with two kinds of properties: physical and mental. He regards mental states or features as a class of physical properties, corresponding to the physical features of the brain, although mental features are not reducible to physical ones. Consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, property of the brain. Searle claims that his theory is a "pluralism of properties."
Searle rejects idealist theories, such as representational and phenomenalist idealism.
Naive mathematics
Naive mathematics, also called informal or intuitive mathematics, has historically been the primary form of mathematical endeavor of all times and in all cultures, and has been the subject of the ethno-cultural study of mathematics.
Use natural language or informal but direct language, without detours or sophistication.
Uses simple, intuitive concepts, along with examples, the concrete manifestations of the concepts.
It does not use superficial formalizations that hide its true meaning. It does not use axioms.
It links naturally with philosophy.
It is associated with discovery and creativity.
It is a deep mathematics, associated with consciousness and descending (it goes from the general to the particular).
It is a unified mathematics, where everything is contemplated as the same thing.
Formal mathematics, on the other hand:
It uses natural language accompanied by formal language.
Uses complex and superficial formalizations. Uses axioms.
Does not link with philosophy.
It is associated with demonstration.
It is a superficial and ascending mathematics (it tries to go from the particular to the general).
It is a mathematics fragmented in particular domains.
An example is the concept of group (or aggregate or grouping), which is a fundamental and primary concept in all cultures. Naive set theory can be considered as a first approach to this field and is sufficient for many purposes.
It uses a natural and understandable language to describe sets.
A set is described as a well-defined collection of objects. It can be defined extensively (by specifying the objects one by one) or by a property shared by the objects. Objects can be of any type: numbers, persons, other sets, etc.
In a set, the order of the elements is irrelevant, and repeated elements are ignored.
A universal set U (the set of all sets) is considered to exist. Therefore, there exists the complementary of a set.
It does not consider the issue of consistency and completeness.
In this sense, Paul Halmos' book "Naive Set Theory" is considered to be the best introduction to naive set theory, where "naive" really means "concept-based", without axioms.
The first naive set theory was Cantor's. It was labeled "naive" because it was later found to lead to paradoxes, such as Russell's paradox.
All fields of mathematics can also be approached naively. Thus, in addition to naive set theory, we can speak of naive logic, naive arithmetic, naive algebra, etc., which try to rely on simple, intuitive and straightforward concepts. For example, naive logic could be a logic based on a single primitive and its converse.
Therefore, a naive mathematics is more powerful, efficient, and creative than conventional formal mathematics.
MENTAL as Naive Language
The ideas of set and set membership are primary and intuitive concepts. There is nothing mysterious or problematic about them. Unfortunately, they have become problematic, convoluted, and difficult in the hands of mathematicians and logicians. It is time to return directly to the concepts, as they are, without modifying or distorting them, avoiding all unnecessary complexity. This is the naive point of view, the MENTAL point of view.
MENTAL is a direct or naive realism in the sense that it connects directly with the primary archetypes, which are simple and intuitive concepts, without the complex, superficial and confusing apparatus of axiomatic set theory. With MENTAL one returns to Cantor's original concept of grouping or group, the natural, simple and intuitive concept. Moreover, paradoxes are overcome.
In MENTAL, ingenuity is represented by degrees of freedom. Each primitive is a degree of freedom. in this sense, it incorporates naive logic, naive arithmetic, naive algebra, and so on.
MENTAL can also be described as "naive" for claiming a priori to solve the problem of the foundations of mathematics. But the results obtained can be considered as a "gift" received a posteriori precisely because of this naive attitude. Although the main gift is that of the universality of language, as a direct consequence of its simplicity.
In MENTAL, the naive attitude reaches its supreme degree, with the result of the universality of language.
The same archetypes manifest themselves at the external and internal level. Therefore, ontology and epistemology are the same thing.
MENTAL is also an axiomatic system, but the axioms are direct and where syntax and semantics go together. Its axiomatics is simple, and uses a formal language where there is a biunivocal correspondence between syntax and semantics, so there is only one interpretation. And there is correspondence between theory and practice.
With MENTAL there is total freedom to define sets and operate with them.
MENTAL is a language/system that transcends set theory. It is a foundation of mathematics where each primitive is a degree of freedom.
As a theory and practice, and because of its relation to cognitive activity, MENTAL is much more powerful than axiomatic set theory.
In MENTAL there is no conceptual relativism. There is only one (deep) reality and different (superficial) manifestations.
MENTAL resolves the conflict between common and scientific beliefs about the world, as well as the conflict between the physical and the mental.
MENTAL is naive realist, but generalized reality, which includes the mental. It is naive realist-idealist language.
The universal semantic primitives or primary archetypes are the supreme universals, the supreme categories of reality. Particular objects are manifestations of these universals.
The ingenuity of MENTAL is based, not on the senses, but on the perfect correspondence between the internal and the external, between the physical senses and the mental senses, for both are manifestations of the same archetypes. The physical senses are only intermediaries between the external and the internal world. The mental is closer to the truth than the physical, for it is closer to the individual and universal consciousness.
MENTAL is the best demonstration that the naive, the direct and intuitive is the way.
Addenda
The term "naive"
From Latin, "ingenuus", meaning "natural", "pure", "unaltered". In turn, "ingenuus" comes from "gignere", meaning "to beget" or "to generate". With the prefix "in" it indicated "born within" the Roman Empire, the free-born men, the citizens of the empire.
In the time of the philosopher Cicero (1st century B.C.) the meaning of this word was extended to qualify an honest and upright man.
The poet Lucretius used the expression "ingenuus fontes" to refer to "limpid springs" and, a few years later, the historian Titus Livius expressed: "nihil ultra quam ingenui" (nothing more than ingenuity).
In texts of King Alfonso X the Wise, the term "ingenuous" still retained that meaning, but at some point the sense of "honest" gave way to the current denotation of "candid" or 'innocent'.
The "naive realism" of Julio Palacios
Julio Palacios was one of the leading Spanish physicists of the 20th century. He rejected Einsteinian relativity on the basis of his philosophical interpretation of physics, which he called "naive realism". Palacios applied a penetrating kind of common sense, which lent an extraordinary clarity to his ideas. He constructed an alternative theory of Relativity, in which he arrived at the same formulas as Einstein, but saving the Newtonian conceptions of space and time and avoiding paradoxes. According to Palacios, the paradoxes disappear if the Lorentz equations are dispensed with, that is, the postulate of the equivalence of all inertial systems is abandoned.
Bibliography
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