"We begin to understand something when we experience its essence" (Brian Weiss).
"Essence is the truth of being" (Hegel).
Essentialism
The different characteristics and conceptions of essence
Essence as necessity.
In philosophy, essentialism is a doctrine that asserts that every entity can be described or defined by a set of necessary, primary or essential properties, and a set of contingent (or secondary) properties, i.e., which it may or may not have; they are accessory or accidental; their absence does not alter the nature of the entity.
None of the primary properties can be dispensed with, because the entity would cease to be as such, since the property is part of the essence or being of the entity.
Secondary properties can be dispensed with without affecting the essence or being of the entity.
The essential properties remain unchanged after superficial changes. Behind the apparent and accidental is the essential and necessary.
Entities that share a set of essential properties form a class or category.
Essence as an intrinsic property.
In philosophy a distinction is made between intrinsic properties and relational properties of an object. Essence is associated with intrinsic or immanent properties, i.e., properties of the object that do not depend on other objects.
For the relational view, essence does not exist, there are only relations between objects. Knowledge of an object can only be attained by observing the relations with other objects, that is, by observing the various structures of which that object is a part.
For Richard Rorty, objects do not have an intrinsic nature. Objects only have relations with other objects and that is the only knowledge we can have of objects. Knowledge is obtained by descriptions based on relations. There are several possible descriptions, depending on the relations we consider. There is no privileged description.
Mathematical category theory is a purely relational view. It does not consider the properties of mathematical objects but only the structures they form among themselves, their relations. A category is formed by some objects and some relations (morphisms) between those objects. Even an object is considered an automorphism, a morphism with itself. Therefore, a category is a system of binary relations. The problem with category theory is that the semantics of "morphism" is open: it admits many interpretations.
Essence as a modal property de re.
There are two types of modal properties. Modality de re concerns the properties that an object has in virtue of itself. Modality de dicto concerns the properties attributed to an object.
In general, the essence of an entity is considered to be constituted by the modal properties de re, i.e., they are necessary properties. According to Aristotle, essence is ontologically prior to modality.
Essence as transcendence.
Plato is the first essentialist philosopher, for he conceives of the existence of a higher, transcendent subtle realm of pure and eternal ideal forms, the material objects of this world being mere reflections or imperfect projections of those ideal forms. The essence resides in the higher world of ideas, which is the truly real realm. The soul is the instrument of knowledge, for it enables us to access the higher world, the intelligible world, and to grasp the essence of things.
For Plato, there are two realities: the essential (or ideal) and the perceived. The sensible (or empirical) world is only appearance, superficial, where the multiplicity of singular things resides. In the superior intelligible world resides the unity and the universal.
Essence vs. Existence and Being.
From the metaphysical and ontological point of view, essence underlies the background of all being, is invisible and is only accessible by intuition. The essence of an entity is what makes that entity what it is.
Existence is generally considered to be the manifestation of essence, so essence precedes existence. Essence is the profound, and existence is the apparent and superficial world of forms that we contemplate with our senses.
For Aristotle, the distinction between essential and non-essential properties reduces to the distinction between what an entity is and how an entity is.
Essence as a philosophical category.
For Aristotle natural objects can be categorized by being ontologically correlated. Each category corresponds to an essence. Essences are always of a general character, there are no individual essences. The category of substance is the universal essence or first category.
Essence vs. substance.
The term "substance" was coined by Aristotle to refer to the primary reality, the basic and universal substratum of all that exists. Upon substance are based the accidents, the properties of particular elements. All forms of accidental being are based on the unity and universality of substance. Substance is the first of the categories of Being. On the other hand, essence is what makes a particular thing what it is and not something else.
Descartes called "substance" anything that does not need anything else to exist. For Heidegger, one must forget the term "substance" and remain only with Being.
Essence as form.
In Plato's idealism, essence is what characterizes form. Essence is permanent, unchanging, and eternal. Forms are universal and are instantiated to create ordinary objects.
According to Aristotle's theory of hylemorphism, every entity has two aspects: matter and form, the form being what gives the entity its identity, its essence.
Essentialism vs. Nominalism.
The metaphysics of the essence of things leads to the so-called "problem of universals". For nominalists, universals are just "names." We experience the world through individual things and not essences or abstract universals.
Locke distinguishes between real essences and nominal essences. The nominal ones are the definitions of the things we know and are describable, expressible. The real ones are what things actually are, which are ungraspable and unknowable. Only nominal essences are accessible at the human level.
For Popper, essentialism is the doctrine of universals as real entities.
Essence and language.
For Plato, language communicates the immutable essences of things.
For Aristotle, language is an instrument or means of knowledge to reach the true essence of things.
For Hume, essences are not real, they have only linguistic meaning. We have only the meanings associated with words. There is no substance or essence.
For Hobbes, the notion of essence is meaningless. It only makes sense to show the meanings associated with linguistic expressions. Language has an arbitrary character. Universals are nothing but names. Universals are such by their use and not by their reference to some kind of entities.
For Husserl, essences are not metaphysical realities or mental concepts but ideal units of signification. Through intentional consciousness we apprehend essences as signifiers. Essences are timeless and a priori idealities.
Essentialism as rationalism or intelligibility.
The essence of things in reality is what makes them intelligible. Rationalism is a bridge between idealism and reality. The essence is the coherent core of knowledge. Concepts arise from essence. Essence is the key to understanding.
For Duns Scotus, the essence is the reality of the intelligible. And metaphysics is a science of essences as intelligible realities.
Essence as the internal coherence of an object.
That coherence is produced by the restriction of the properties of the object that make it immune to change.
For Zubiri, essence is the "ultimate moment of substantivity". What is primary is not substance but what he calls "substantivity," a set of interrelated and interdependent properties that form a self-sufficient and complete entity.
Essentialism as reductionism.
According to reductionism, all scientific research must proceed in a top-down manner, breaking down the object of study into simpler and simpler components until it reaches the essential components that are non-decomposable and self-sufficient, and from which (in an ascending manner) to be able to explain or describe the object. Descartes was the great advocate of reductionism.
Essentialism vs. Simplicity.
Simplicity taken to the extreme leads to essentialism, the radical elimination of what is redundant, superfluous or contingent in order to remain only with the essence, the essential nucleus, with the foundation, with what is truly necessary. Essentialism is the principle of radical economy.
A good model or theory captures what is essential or most important for a given purpose. To seek the essence of a theory or system is to reduce the number of laws or hypotheses to a minimum.
Essence vs. Intuition.
Intuitions are psychological or epistemological essentialisms; they are mental shortcuts or heuristics. Psychological or epistemological essentialism is more intelligible than metaphysical essentialism.
Intuition is the direct experience of something and consists in connecting with its essence. The essence is necessary in all experience. To know the essence of something is to connect with its identity.
For Plato, through intuition we connect with essences (ideas or universal forms). On the contrary, for Aristotle, every universal idea is based on empirical data. Plato applies a descending criterion; Aristotle, an ascending one.
For Kant, the essential is the noumenon, which is unknowable and ungraspable. It can only be intuited. The essence is something elusive, unattainable. It is the inner content of a thing that is hidden from our perception.
According to Husserl, we intuit the essences of things and through this capacity we establish the relation to the world.
Essence and consciousness.
For Plato, we understand the objects of the world when we relate or associate them with those ideal forms. Plato unites opposites: the higher (or ideal) and the lower (matter), a union that is the foundation of consciousness.
For Hegel, the essence is the substantial that underlies appearances and that only has a relation to itself. Only through intuition can we access the essence. When intuition is united with essence both are indissoluble. The essence is the intermediary between being and concept. It is the third element, which we could identify with consciousness.
Essence as abstraction.
Aristotle introduced the concept of abstraction: concepts have their origin in the concrete, in an ascending process, towards the abstract. The result of abstraction is a universal. Abstract universal concepts constitute the essence and foundation of reality.
Essence as deep structure.
For example, the essence of water is that it is composed of H2O molecules. The essence of gold is that it is composed of gold atoms, atomic number 79.
Essence as truth.
According to Hegel, "essence is the truth of being."
According to Leibniz −who conceived the philosophy of possible worlds−, truth is the necessary and essential in all possible worlds.
Essence as logic (or logical grammar).
For the first Wittgenstein (that of the Tractatus), thought, language and reality are isomorphic, they have the same logical structure. The structure of language reflects the structure of internal and external reality. Behind particular languages lies an ideal language based on logical forms and a "logical grammar" of that ideal formal language.
Essence as deep grammar.
For the second Wittgenstein (that of Philosophical Investigations), there is nothing in common in all linguistic phenomena, so that the question of the essence of language is meaningless. Among all languages there is no common structure, but an analogous structure. Particular languages are mere games subject to rules, but all languages have uniformity of appearance.All human languages have particular and arbitrary surface grammars, but they hide a "deep grammar", a common and universal grammar responsible for the construction of the rules of particular languages. "Essence is expressed by grammar" (Philosophical Investigations, 371).
In "The Big Typescript", Wittgenstein writes: "The rules of grammar determine the meaning of a sentence, and whether a combination of words makes sense or not."
For the first Wittgenstein, logic is the key and foundation of reality because logic is transcendental. For the second Wittgenstein, the key to languages is the deep grammar shared by all of them. He suggests that the investigation of deep grammar is the true activity of a philosopher, for therein lies the transcendentality of language.
Both of Wittgenstein's positions are essentialist with respect to language. For the first Wittgenstein, the essence of reality resides in the hidden ideal logical language or logical grammar. For the second Wittgenstein, the essence of all natural languages lies in the common deep grammar of all languages.
Wittgenstein's first position is top-down: from the universality of logic to the particular of languages. Wittgenstein's second position is ascending: from the particular natural languages to deep grammar.
Generic and universal essentialism
Generic essence is the essence associated with a class or category of things. When all entities in the world share a set of essential properties, we have universal essentialism, the foundation of everything.
Universal essentialism is based on unchanging and eternal properties, present in all possible worlds. In philosophy, universal essentialism is represented by the supreme categories of reality: the philosophical categories.
Essentialism vs. Minimalism
The term "minimalism" was born in artistic circles in the 1960s. It is a concept close to essentialism.
Minimalism is usually applied to human manifestations, both scientific (mathematics, logic, computer science, etc.) and humanistic (art, architecture, music, literature, etc.). Minimalism focuses on reduction; it acts from the surface.
Essentialism does not focus on reducing, but on seeking what is important; it is an approach that goes straight to the deep. Essentialism is more philosophical, more theoretical, more conceptual, more profound, while minimalism is more practical, more structural, functional and superficial.
The characteristics of minimalism are:
Maximum simplicity and abstraction. Simple and general laws.
Structural and functional purism. Optimal design.
Order, structure and organization of the elements.
Maximum economy through concentration or compactness of the elements.
Economy of language describing the elements.
Standardization.
It unites the opposites of reduction and synthesis. On the one hand, it tries to reduce the elements to a minimum, without losing identity. On the other hand, it tries to make those elements reflect a synthesis, a general vision.
It unites the opposites of the minimum and the maximum. With the minimum number of elements, the aim is to achieve the maximum possible functionality.
The maxim of minimalism is "Less is more." According to Greg McKeown, author of "Essentialism. Achieve maximum results with minimum effort," the maxim of essentialism is "Less is better."
Modal logic, the philosophy of possible worlds and essentialism
The term "modal logic" is used to describe a family of interrelated logics, such as temporal logic, deontic logic (of ethics), doxastic logic (of belief), and so on. In its most basic sense it refers to the logic of necessity and possibility. The two modal forms of this logic are:
x necessarily has the property p.
It is possible that x has property p.
That is, the truth of a sentence relating an object to a predicate is qualified.
Modal logic starts with Aristotle with his development of a modal syllogistic in his work De Interpretatione. In the Middle Ages it was promoted by William of Occam and John Scotus. Modern modal logic began in 1918 with C.I. Lewis, who proposed a new semantics for the conditional expression "If A, then B", which he called "strict implication": it is impossible that A and not B. Contemporary modal logic starts in 1963 with Saul Kripke formalizing modal logic by means of the semantics of possible worlds.
The development of modal logic has brought about a revitalization of essentialist philosophy. In this logic, a property p of an object x is defined as:
Essential. When x has property p in all possible worlds where x exists.
Contingent. When there exists at least one possible world where x exists and does not possess the property p.
A proposition can be true in one possible world and false in another. For Leibniz, a necessary truth is that which is true in all possible worlds.
The concept of "possible world" was introduced by Leibniz in a 1710 work known as "Theodicy". Theodicy (or natural theology) is a branch of philosophy whose aim is the rational demonstration of the existence of God, as well as the description of his nature and attributes.
There is no consensus on the meaning of possible world and its ontology. For David Lewis, possible worlds actually exist and are independent of each other. Our world is only one among possible worlds. Lewis's philosophy is called "modal realism". For Saul Kripke, possible worlds are described, they are mental. For Robert Adams and Alvin Platinga, they are abstract Platonic entities. In modal logic, the notion of possible world is taken as primitive and, therefore, is not defined.
According to Kripke and Putnam, possible worlds are not discovered, defined, or stipulated, i.e., they are established by consensus or agreement. This makes Quine say that modal logic based on the stipulation of possible worlds is essentialist, since the criteria for establishing objects and their properties leads to a new essentialism.
The notion of possible world is used to define the notion of essence. According to Kripke, "it is possible that x has the property p" means that there is a possible world in which x has the property p. And a statement is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds.
Kripke establishes the concept of a "rigid designator," a name capable of designating an object in all possible worlds in which the object exists and designating nothing in those worlds in which it does not exist. Examples of rigid designators are names such as "water" and "gold"; names of sensations such as "pain" and "pleasure"; mathematical expressions such as "2+2", etc.
Non-rigid designators do not designate the same object in all possible worlds. For example, "the number of planets", "the King of France", etc.
Neoessentialism
Neoessentialism is classical essentialism (there are entities that have essential properties), but extended with the concept used by Kripke and Putnam called "natural kind", a term introduced in contemporary philosophy by Quine in his 1969 essay "Natural Kinds". A natural kind is a class of things in nature, which is objective and which has essential, deep and necessary properties that characterize it.
Kripke and Putnam conceive of essence as properties associated with a natural kind, thus linking nominal and real essences.
According to Kripke, a natural class is necessarily determined by a rigid designator. Rigid designators are names of natural classes.
The traditional view of a class is given by a conjunction of properties. Natural classes are different from traditional classes and their characteristics are:
A natural class is a class of objects that possess the same internal or deep structure.
All objects necessarily possess essential properties and belong to natural classes.
A natural class is objective, ontologically real and is not the result of a mere artificial grouping of elements.
The set of essential properties of an object are not enough to identify an object because those properties are necessary, but not sufficient. For example, having a certain genetic code is not enough, because epigenetics is required to identify the biological being.
Some essential properties of natural kinds can be discovered a posteriori. An example of a natural class is water, whose essence is to be composed of H2O molecules, an essence or structure discovered by science.
Scientific essentialism
Scientific essentialism is a new scientific paradigm of philosophical speculation that has received increasing attention in recent years. It is based on the natural kinds proposed by Kripke and Putnam, with variants.
The term "scientific essentialism" was coined by George Bealer in his 1987 article "The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism". In this article, Bealer questions the Kripkean position that some essences of natural kinds can be discovered a posteriori. Currently, it is Brian Ellis who is one of the main proponents of scientific essentialism [Ellis, 2002, 2007, 2013].
The fundamental goal of scientific essentialism is to try to find the essences or principles of the world through scientific research in order to arrive at the most fundamental and definitive science, a kind of "theory of everything" that serves to describe and explain reality. He tries to connect the scientific conception of the world and metaphysics, based on the fact that there are scientific concepts that raise important metaphysical questions, such as: natural kinds, the ontology of essential properties, and the relationship between natural kinds and natural laws.
The main features of scientific essentialism are:
A natural class consists of essential, necessary, and non-reducible properties. Objects having the same essential properties are members of the same natural class. An electron has essential properties: negative electric charge, mass, spin, and so on. Water has the property that it is made up of H2O molecules. Gold has the property that its atomic number is 79. Our world is of a certain kind, a kind that has some essential properties.
The essential properties of natural objects allow their classification into categories: natural classes. Everything belonging to a natural class behaves according to the essential properties of that class. There are no individual essences.
Behind the superficial properties of objects are hidden deep properties, hidden essential properties, which constitute the true essence of a natural class. These essential properties are not individual properties.
Real essences are different from nominal ones. Real essences are associated with nature. Nominal essences are the set of predicates that describe a natural kind and are associated with language.
Certain essential properties of objects not only determine the nature of those objects, but also determine how those objects behave. They behave, not because of external constraints, but because of their intrinsic nature. The essential properties of things include not only what they are, but also what they do.
The aim of science must be to discover the underlying essential properties of reality, the essential properties of natural kinds. The essences of natural kinds can only be discovered by empirical science.
The laws of nature are manifestations of the underlying essential properties. The fundamental laws of nature depend upon the essential properties of the things upon which it operates and are not, therefore, independent of them.
This conception is different from the empiricist one, which asserts that things behave according to the laws of nature. But the laws of nature are merely descriptive superficial laws, which do not explain the deep causes. We perceive only the superficial. The laws of nature describe the phenomena of nature, but they do not penetrate into their essence, they do not explain them. Scientific essentialism tries to penetrate into the essence or depth of things in order to explain them.
The essence of a natural phenomenon (such as gravity) is the ultimate explanation of the phenomenon in terms of the underlying essences, its deep or essential properties. Science attends only to the phenomenal, the external, and does not penetrate to the underlying level, i.e., what the world really is. Science focuses on the "how", not on the "what". Physicists can describe gravity, but they do not know what it is, its essence.
Since essence is sometimes difficult to define, science often turns to operationalism: defining a concept by a set of operations. By doing so, the concept becomes more intelligible and accessible. For example, the concept of computation, defined by a simple set of operations of a Turing machine. Operationalism is a crucial idea in the elaboration of scientific theories.
MENTAL, a Universal Essentialist Language
Science must be based on something deeper than itself, therefore, it must be based on something that cannot be strictly scientific, but deeper, of a philosophical type. A discipline cannot be based on itself. For example, physics must be based on something that is not physical, that is, on something deeper than physics. Essentialism is the search for a foundation of reality.
But essence is a diffuse concept, like all philosophical concepts, which justifies the great diversity of opinions and points of view about it. And to define essence we have to rely on something deeper than essence, which is impossible. It is like trying to define consciousness; it is something that transcends the mental level.
The only way to ground science is through the primary archetypes, the archetypes of consciousness, which link the deep (inaccessible) and the superficial (accessible), the particular and the universal, the intuitive and the rational, the abstract and the concrete, the theoretical and the practical, ontology and epistemology, reductionism and holism, the descriptive and the operative, syntax and semantics, realism and idealism, the rational and the intuitive, the intensive and the extensive, etc. In short, the integral union of opposites. Consciousness is the new paradigm of science.
One of the keys to the progress of the sciences has been precisely to unite the descriptive and the operative.
MENTAL, as the language of the archetypes of consciousness, harmonizes the different visions of essence:
MENTAL is a universal essential language. The universal essence manifests itself in all fields, including language. This universal essence is constituted by primary archetypes. These archetypes are universal invariants that are reflected in an ideal and universal language. The essences are archetypal forms.
From this universal essence (or universal center) the totality is contemplated and allows us to penetrate into the true deep structure of things.
It is a necessary language. All primitives, as dimensions of reality, are necessary to describe reality.
In MENTAL a clear distinction is made between the essential and the necessary. The universal necessary has a priori character and are the universal semantic primitives. The particular necessary is implemented by generic expressions. The possible is that which is not limited by necessity. MENTAL is a generalized modal language, i.e., the necessary and the possible is something of a general kind, not only applicable to logic.
It is a higher, transcendental reality based on simple universals which are primary forms of signification.
With MENTAL the debated concept of "possible world" is clarified. MENTAL is the Magna Carta of possible worlds, including the world we call "real". It is 12 universal essences. It constitutes the foundation and essence of all possible worlds. The essence is the same in all possible worlds. All possible worlds are connected through the primary archetypes. Rather than speaking of "possible worlds" we should speak of "possible expressions". All possible expressions potentially already exist. Possible worlds belong to the mental world, so it makes no sense to speak of truth or falsity of an expression. In MENTAL, possible worlds are the domain of consciousness. MENTAL can be identified with truth, considered as something that is common to all possible worlds.
A distinction is made between "substance" and "essence". Essences are the primary archetypes. Substance are the characters with which, by means of the essences, the concrete expressions are constructed.
It is the language of consciousness. The primitives of language are archetypes of consciousness. It is the integral union of opposites. It unites the "what" and the "how", what is (essence) and how it manifests, the deep and the superficial.
The common essence of all things leads us to universal understanding, to consciousness. Knowledge is really a process based on the common essence of all things. The true essence is based on the union of opposites.
It is the foundation of internal (mental) and external (physical) reality. Human language, in general, reflects consciousness, for it unites the inner (mental) world with the outer (physical) world.
It is an intuitive and rational language. The essence is related to a deep meaning: intuition.
It is an intrinsic and relational language. Primitives are intrinsic to all reality, and manifest relationally.
It is a mathematical language. The laws of nature are structures based on primary archetypes. Hence mathematics is so useful in describing natural laws.
Its primitives are philosophical categories. It is a universal categorization of reality.
It is a scientific-philosophical essentialism. It harmonizes science and philosophy. Scientific essentialism resides in the primary archetypes. It is the last frontier. Beyond it is impossible to penetrate. All reality is built on the primary archetypes. The scientific is the superficial. The essential is the profound. The primary archetypes connect the scientific and the essential.
It is a minimalist language because it simplifies and harmonizes theory and practice.
It is a universal grammar and a universal language.
The early Wittgenstein's conception is horizontal: there is isomorphism between language, thought and reality. But really these three domains are manifestations of the same deep principles: the primary archetypes.
The first Wittgenstein did not go so far as to concretize the logical grammar, the logical forms of the supposed ideal language. The second Wittgenstein spoke of a "deep grammar" but stopped short of proposing a set of rules underlying natural languages.
MENTAL harmonizes the two Wittgensteins: it is the ideal language sought by the first Wittgenstein and the deep grammar sought by the second Wittgenstein. In MENTAL, universal grammar and universal language coincide.
The problem of essentialism of natural kinds
The essentialism of natural classes admits many interpretations and raises many questions. What is meant by "natural"? The interpretation of "natural" seems open.What is a natural class at the ontological and epistemological level.What exactly is an essential property.What exactly are essential properties and what do they mean.What are their semantics.Are biological species natural classes.What categories count as natural classes?
Science cannot be founded on natural classes because the natural is physical in character. The essential does not belong to this physical world. The essential must be metaphysical and universal.
MENTAL transcends the natural classes. Primary archetypes are universal or essential categories or classes, with perfectly defined semantics.
Following the principle of descending causality, from the primary archetypes one must look for the mathematical and physical archetypes responsible for natural laws, not for particular natural classes.
Conclusions
The search for the common essence that underlies all things is the search for the Holy Grail, which allows us to contemplate the superficial from the profound.
MENTAL's universal essentialism allows one to see things more clearly and to solve problems more effectively and with greater ease. It transforms inwardly. You have maximum power, maximum awareness and maximum harmony. Everything is seen as connected.
In MENTAL converge or converge: essence, consciousness, truth, knowledge, universality, idealism, foundation, philosophical categories, possible worlds, mental model, universal grammar and universal language.
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