"In mathematics 'necessary' and 'everything' go together" (Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations).
"The fundamental category for the interpretation of reality is not necessity, but possibility. Everything
Everything that exists is a possibility that has been realized" (Leibniz).
"If so it was, so it could be; if so it were, so it could be; but since it is not, it is not. That is logic" (Claude Lévi-Strauss).
Modal Logic
Modal logic is the logic of necessary truths and possible truths. It is a logic that employs the concepts of "necessary" and "possible" in its expressions and reasoning. The notation is:
It is possible that x: ◇x
It is necessary that x: □x
For the possible there are 4 values:
N°
Value
Notation
1
It is possible that x
◇x
2
It is possible that non-x
◇¬x
3
It is impossible that x
¬◇x
4
It is impossible for non-x
¬◇¬x
In principle, the opposite of the possible would admit two different answers: the impossible and the necessary. Both options are correct to some extent:
The possible and the impossible are directly opposed.
The concepts of possible and necessary are not directly opposed, but through the negation of x.
Combining the notions of possible and necessary with the values of true and false, we obtain the following two equivalences:
If something is necessarily true, it is not possible for it to be false; and vice versa:
□x ≡ ¬◇¬x
("it is necessary that x" is equivalent to "it is not possible that non-x")
If something can be true, it need not be false; and vice versa:
◇x ≡ ¬□¬x
("it is possible that x" is equivalent to "it is not necessary not-x")
Considering these equivalences, we have the following table:
N°
Value
Notation
Equivalence
Notation
1
It is possible that x
◇x
It is not necessary that non-x
¬□¬x
2
It is possible that non-x
◇¬x
It is not necessary that x
¬□x
3
It is impossible that x
¬◇x
It is necessary that non-x
□¬x
4
It is impossible that non-x
¬◇¬x
It is necessary that x
□x
These equivalences are analogous to those between the universal quantifiers ∀ (all) and the existential ∃ (some):
If every element has property P, then no element exists that does not have property P;; and vice versa:
∀xPx ≡ ¬∃x¬Px
If there exists an element that has property P;, then not all elements do not have property P;; and vice versa:
∃xPx ≡ ¬∀x¬Px
We can then establish the following correspondence between modality and quantification:
Necessary (□) ↔ All (∀)
Possible (◇) ↔ Some (∃)
Since one modal operator can be defined as a function of the other, it is sufficient to take one of them as a primitive. The one of necessity (□) is usually chosen.
In addition to the above two equivalences, we have the rule that the necessity of something implies its possibility: □x → ◇x
The Evolution of Modal Logic
There have been three major eras in which logicians have been concerned with modality: classical antiquity, medieval times, and the twentieth century. The latter has seen the greatest development, the most prominent figures being Rudolf Carnap, Clarence Irving Lewis and Saul Kripke.
Aristotle, in the Peri Hermeneias (On Interpretation) −belonging to the Organon (set of works on logic which was the sole source of logical science for centuries)− distinguishes 4 modes (the necessary, the impossible, the possible and the contingent), as well as their interrelationships.
The medieval period was devoted almost exclusively to study and comment on the Aristotelian inheritance: the Organon. An important contribution was the distinction between "necessity de re" (the real) and "necessity de dicto" (the linguistic, propositional or logical). Aristotle had always dealt with modalities of re and it can hardly be interpreted that he dealt with modalities of dicto.
Hugh McCall, in his 1906 work, "Symbolic Logic and its aplications", in defining the concept of inconsistency, appeals to the notion of possibility.
Clarence Irving Lewis −usually cited as C.I. Lewis− is considered the true founder of modern modal logic, by proposing its axiomatic formalization and the formalization of the modal operators of possibility and necessity.
In 1912 he published "Conditionals and the Algebra of Logic", the first symbolic and formal treatment of modal logic.
In 1918 he publishes "A Survey of Symbolic Logic", where he proposes a new conditional (the strict implication) to formally collect the natural meaning of "if p then q", and introduces for the first time the modal operators of necessity (□) and possibility (◇).
His 1929 work "Mind and the World Order" [2004] is considered the most important work of the 20th century in epistemology.
In his 1932 work "Symbolic Logic" [1959] −written in collaboration with C.H. Langford− he establishes different formal axiomatic systems (the systems S1 to S5).
Rudolf Carnap, in his 1934 works "Logical Syntax of Language" [2010], the concepts of necessity and possibility appear explicitly, which evoked the idea of Leibniz's "possible worlds".
In his article "Modalities And Quantification" [1946], the concept of "state description" appears, a precursor of the concept of "possible world": a set of maximally consistent propositions.
In his 1947 work "Meaning and Necessity" [2008] he develops an integrated theory of physical and logical necessity, realizing for the first time a semantic interpretation.
Georg Henrik von Wright published in 1951 in "An Essay in Modal Logic", in which he gave a new interpretation of the necessity operator (□) as "it is known that", thus inaugurating "epistemic logic", a stream within modal logic. Epistemic logic is concerned with reasoning about knowledge, a subject that links with philosophy, language, mind, artificial intelligence and computational science.
Saul Kripke, in the 1960s, extended modal logic with the so-called "semantics of possible worlds", inspired by the ideas of Leibniz and Carnap. Modal logic is formalized by Kripke by means of an axiomatic system called "K" (Kripke's), which includes possible worlds, the accessibility relations between them, and a veritative function that indicates in which worlds a proposition is true.
Richard Montague, in the late 1960s, used the concept of "possible world" as the cornerstone of the formalization of his universal grammar and as a tool for philosophical analysis.
Jaako Hintikka, in his 1962 publication "Knowing and Believing" [1979] formalized the semantics of possible worlds by means of the concept of "model set". In general, he proposes to use modalities to capture the semantics of knowledge in the fields such as epistemic logic (the logic of knowledge), doxastic logic (the logic of belief) and deontic logic (the logic of obligation).
Modal logic has led to important general results and has opened up new lines of research in semantics, which are being applied in various fields such as demonstration theory, computer science and artificial intelligence.
MENTAL and Modal Logic
MENTAL offers a simple, expressive and intuitive formalization of modal logic, yet extremely generic and powerful.
Beyond modal logic
MENTAL does not require special modality operators to describe and operate with necessity and possibility. These concepts transcend logic, as do quantifiers and predicates. They belong to a higher semantic level than formal logic, which is of a superficial type. Modality covertly hides a reference to human knowledge and, therefore, it is not about logic, but about epistemology. In MENTAL this aspect becomes evident because:
Necessity is linked to a generic expression (parameterized or not), which can be of any type and not only of a logical type. The requirement is a particular case of the generic. Therefore, the "need" operator is not needed as a primitive. The "Generalization" primitive is sufficient. In the case where a condition is used, the antecedent specifies the condition to be detected. The consequent specifies the action to be performed.
The possibility is what is not specified as necessary.
With MENTAL it is emphasized that generic expressions are of the highest level of abstraction, since it allows expressing the universal quantifier and the modal operator of necessity, as well as functions, rules, classes, etc. It also allows to express general or particular knowledge of a domain, which is mandatory, to implement hypotheses or beliefs and to experiment with them, etc. This knowledge is not necessarily linked to logic.
A modal logic without specific axioms
Modal logic is based on axioms. Unlike classical logic, there are different axiomatic systems, with different axioms. The issue of which axioms are the most suitable is a matter of much debate and controversy. MENTAL, on the other hand, does not need specific axioms of modal logic. The primitives and the generic axioms that relate the primitives are enough.
Notación
The modal logic notation □x (it is necessary that x) indicates that x cannot vary. Quine defined "p is necessary" as "p is equal to itself". For Krike, identity is an essential property of each object and individual, an internal relation that each object maintains with itself. In modal logic, identity can be expressed as □(x=x) (it is necessary that x is equal to itself).
In MENTAL, □x is expressed by the generic expression 〈x〉. But the expression x must specify a relation, which is the one to be maintained. And □(x=x) is expressed by the generic expression.
〈( x = x )〉
In MENTAL, identity is a particular case of necessity.
It is possible to change the MENTAL notation to the standard notation, if desired:
〈( □x =: 〈x〉 )〉 □(a>12 → (a = 12))
represents
〈( a>12 → (a = 12) )〉
Examples
〈( x/man → x/mortal )〉
(if x is male, x is necessarily mortal)
〈( c = a+b )〉
(it is necessary that c is always the sum of a and b)
((a = 7) (b = 5))
c // ev. 12
((a = 8) (b = 6))
c // ev. 14
〈( a>12 → (a = 12) )〉
(it is necessary that a is not greater than 12)
(a = 75)
a // ev. 12
〈( a = 5 )〉
(it is necessary that a is always 5)
(a = 75)
a // ev. 5
〈( a∉A → (A = {a A↓} )〉
(it is necessary that a belongs to the set A)
(A = {b c})
A // ev. {a b c}
Addenda
Conceptual pragmatism
C.I. Lewis is also the founder of conceptual pragmatism, which is based on the following main ideas:
The mind determines the structure of reality. The mind possesses a set of a priori concepts with which it interprets reality. These concepts are not of an absolute type; they are the product of social and cultural inheritance.
A priori concepts are abstractions, relational patterns or abstract configurations of relations.
Knowledge begins and ends with experience. Only with experience can something have meaning. One cannot separate experience from cognition. Empirical knowledge depends on the constructive activity of the mind.
It is necessary to distinguish between "linguistic meaning" (the logical relations between its terms) and "empirical meaning" (the expressions relating to experience).
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