"Brouwer's construction of intuitionistic mathematics is nothing more and nothing less than an investigation of the limits that the intellect can reach in its unfolding" (Arend Heyting).
"The edifice of intuitionistic mathematics is an art, not a science" (Brouwer).
"There can be no mathematics if it has not been constructed intuitively" (Brouwer).
Brouwer's Intuitionistic Logic
Classical logic is a bivalent logic: it uses only two truth values: V (true) and F (false). It is an analytical, superficial and dualistic logic.
Intuitionistic logic is a synthetic, deep, non-dualistic logic. It is a more flexible logic than classical logic. In other words, classical logic is more restrictive than intuitionistic logic.
According to Michael Dummett [1977], the correct logic to apply to mathematics is not classical logic, but intuitionistic logic.
Intuitionistic logic breaks with the duality V-F of classical logic, where ¬V = F and ¬F = V, and has the following characteristics:
Truth
The traditional concept of truth in classical logic is replaced by the concept of constructive demonstration (or constructive procedure). In classical logic, a truth value V (true) or F (false) is assigned to a proposition. In intuitionistic logic a true value is assigned to a mathematical entity only after a constructive demonstration has been found, and a false value is assigned when it is shown not to be constructible. If a constructive proof has not been found for a mathematical entity, it does not mean that it is false, but that it is not known whether it is true or false.
A mathematical entity can also be a relation between mathematical entities. For example, the relations 3×4 = 12 and a∈{a b} are true. And the relations 4<3 and 1+1 = 3 are false.
The truth of a mathematical entity is language independent. It does not depend on its formal or linguistic expression.
The principle of double negation.
In general, the law of elimination of double negation does not hold: ¬¬A → A. On the other hand, the converse implication is valid: A → ¬¬A.
The expression ¬A indicates that A is not constructible. Denying that "A is not constructible" does not imply that "A is constructible". If we do not find a constructive procedure for a mathematical entity, this does not mean that it is false, since it may happen that later we find it, or it may happen that we prove that it is impossible to construct it. In the latter case, the entity would indeed be false.
As Brower used to say, using a simile, the impossibility of proving the guilt of a defendant does not prove his innocence.
In this sense, there is asymmetry between positive and negative sentences, a symmetry that does exist in classical logic. In intuitionistic logic, the positive sentence (A) is "stronger" (has more value) than the negative sentence (¬A).
The principle of the excluded third party (PTE)
In classical logic, the ETP states that a proposition is either true or false; there is no third value. In propositional logic it is expressed as (A ∨ ¬A). This principle in propositional logic is equivalent (by De Morgan's law) to its dual: ¬(A ∧ ¬A), which is the principle of non-contradiction. These principles are tautologies in classical logic:
(A ∨ ¬A) = V ¬(A ∧ ¬A) = V
But in intuitionistic logic a distinction is made between the two principles:
PTE (A ∨ ¬A) is not valid, but ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A) is valid.
Nor is its dual principle, the principle of non-contradiction ¬(A ∧ ¬A) fulfilled.
Brouwer observed that the PTE had been established for finite situations and had been generalized without justification for infinite situations. For Brouwer this was equivalent to saying a priori that every mathematical problem has a solution. Accepting the PTE is equivalent to accepting the Hilbertian axiom of resolvability of all mathematical problems. By questioning this principle, Brouwer anticipated Gödel's incompleteness theorem by a quarter of a century. That is, there are problems that are undecidable, i.e., it is not possible to know their truth or falsity. There are also problems that we do not know if they will ever be solved or if they will be proved to be undecidable. For example:
Goldbach's conjecture: every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers (equal or different).
The conjecture of infinite twin prime numbers.
The Riemann hypothesis, a conjecture on the relation between the zeros of the Riemann zeta function and the prime numbers.
For traditional mathematics, every real number is either rational or irrational. For intuitionism, an irrational number is a convergent sequence of infinite rational numbers defined by a law relating one number to the previous one, so in general it is not possible to determine whether a number is rational or irrational.
Therefore, the Dirichlet function f(x) = 1 if x is rational and f(x ) = 0 if x is irrational does not make sense because rational numbers cannot be strictly distinguished from irrational numbers.
In the infinite decimal expansion of π, several questions can be raised such as: does one digit appear more often than the others? Are there infinite pairs of consecutive equal digits? Does a certain (sufficiently long) sequence appear? Etc.
However, a conjecture or mathematical question may become proved in the course of time and cease to be undecidable.
Demonstration by reductio ad absurdum
The proof by reductio ad absurdum (introduced by Hilbert) consists in the fact that to prove that a sentence A is true, it is assumed that the sentence ¬A is true. If it is shown that ¬A is false or leads to a contradiction, then A is true. But for intuitionistic logic this only shows that the negative sentence (¬A) is false, but does not necessarily imply the positive one (A).
The standard interpretation of intuitionistic logic
The standard interpretation of intuitionistic logic is the so-called "BHK interpretation" (of Brouwer, Heyting, and Kolmogorov), also called the "demonstration interpretation," which assigns constructivist meaning to logical symbols.
The BHK interpretation is formed by the following definitions:
A demonstration of A∧B is a demonstration of A and a demonstration of B.
A demonstration of A∨B is a demonstration of A or a demonstration of B.
A demonstration of A→B is a construction that allows us to transform a demonstration of A into a demonstration of B.
The formula ¬A is defined as A→⊥, i.e., a demonstration of ¬A is a construction that transforms a demonstration of A into a contradiction.
A demonstration of ∀xA(x) is a construction that transforms a demonstration < i>d∈D (the range of the variable x) into a demonstration of A(d).
A demonstration of ∃xA(x) is a demonstration of A(d), where d∈D (the rank of the variable x).
The problem with the BHK interpretation is that there is no formal definition of construction, so these definitions can be interpreted in various ways. The BHK interpretation is more heuristic than mathematically precise.
Heyting's Intuitionistic Logic
Arend Heyting −a disciple of Brouwer and a great defender of his ideas−, proposed a new logic to "formalize intuitionism", which is a contradiction, because according to the principles of intuitionism: 1) mathematics is independent of language and does not need to be formalized, since it is a mental construction; 2) logic is an application of mathematics.
Heyting created in 1930 the intuitionistic logic −also called "constructivist logic"− with the intention of making it the formal logical foundation of Brouwer's intuitionistic mathematics, in particular to formalize the non-validity of the classical principles of the excluded third party (ETP) and the law of the elimination of double negation.
However, Brouwer dismissed Heyting's project of formalizing intuitionistic logic, since he did not regard it as authentic intuitionism, although he described his disciple's work as "extraordinarily interesting."
Because of Heyting, intuitionism entered into a formalistic dynamic with which new logics, such as polyvalent logics, were created.
Heyting justified the introduction of a formal axiomatic system for intuitionistic logic by saying that he only considered it an auxiliary means, because mathematics cannot be reduced to a finite set of pre-established rules expressed in a language. Language is somewhat limited and does not allow the expression of thoughts and intuitions. Formalism has an incompleteness because it cannot capture mathematics in its entirety. Logic is an application of mathematics. Inference or deduction is applied mathematics. Logic is not the foundation of mathematics, but an auxiliary means of it.
Intuitionistic logic has been formalized axiomatically in several ways. Besides that of Heyting [1971], there are among others those of Gentzen [1935], Kleene [1952] and Kripke [1965].
The most widespread and well-known interpretation is Kripke's "semantics of possible worlds," which bears a close resemblance to classical model theory. Kripke's models have been adopted as the standard models for modal logic and intuitionistic logic. Kripke's model is a model initially devised for modal logic, but later, Kripke realized that it provided a semantics for intuitionistic logic. So in the semantics of possible worlds there is a close connection between intuitionistic logic and modal logic.
Features of Heyting's intuitionistic logic
Infinite truth values.
In classical logic there are only two truth values (V and F). In intuitionistic logic there are infinite truth values. The logical equivalents of V and F in intuitionistic logic are respectively ⊤ (top) and ⊥ (bottom), which are considered trivial propositions. ¬A indicates that A is not provable, so it is satisfied that A→⊥.
Syntax.
The syntax of the formulas of intuitionistic logic is identical to that of propositional logic and first-order predicate logic. The classical logical connectives (¬ ∨ ∧ →) and the universal (∀) and existential (∃) quantifiers are used. These operators are independent of each other, unlike in classical logic, where, for example, disjunction can be defined by negation and conjunction, and where the existential quantifier can be defined by the universal quantifier and negation:
A ∨ B = ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)
A ∧ B = ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B)
∃xA(x) = ¬∀x ¬A(x)
∀xA(x) = ¬∃x ¬A(x)
But intuitionistic logic distinguishes between formulas that classical logic considers equivalent. For example, De Morgan's laws of classical logic are partially satisfied:
¬(A ∨ B) ↔(¬A ∧ ¬B)
(¬A ∨ ¬B) → ¬(A ∧ B)
(the opposite implication is not satisfied)
¬(A ∧ B) ↔ ¬¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)
(weak De Morgan's law)
Not every formula of intuitionistic predicate logic has its equivalent in prenex form. A prenex formula is one that is written with quantifiers at the beginning. For example, the formula ∀x¬¬(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x ))) is a theorem of intuitionistic logic, but ¬¬¬∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) is not.
Tautologies.
In classical logic, a formula is a tautology if and only if its value is V for all possible values of the variables. In intuitionistic logic, values of Heyting's algebra are used instead of truth values. A formula of intuitionistic logic is valid if and only if it receives the value of T for every value of Heyting's algebra. (Heyting's algebra is explained below).
All the theorems (tautologies) of intuitionistic logic are valid in classical logic, but not vice versa. Intuitionistic logic is more general than classical logic.
Rules of inference.
There are 3 rules of inference:
Modus Ponens.
From A and A → B, we infer B.
Introduction of ∀.
From A → B(x), where x is a variable that does not appear in < i>A, we infer A → ∀xB(x).
Removal of ∃.
From A(x) → B, where x is a variable that does not appear in < i>B, it is inferred ∃xA(x) → B.
MENTAL and Intuitionistic Logic
Truth
In intuitionistic logic a mathematical entity is true if it is constructible.
In MENTAL, any well-formed constructed expression (according to syntactic rules) exists. A relation that is fulfilled between expressions in abstract space exists.
The truth (V) can also be applied to an expression as an extrinsic predicate or attribute: x/V.
Excluded Third Party Principle (ETP)
In MENTAL the PTE applies in 3 senses:
In Condition. A condition is either met or it is not met. It cannot be met "half-way".
In the existential meta-expressions θ and α, which are contrary to each other:
(θ' = α) (α' = θ)
In qualitative magnitudes (q) such as high, rich, fast, etc. and their contraries (q'), including true (V) and false (F), which are also contrary to each other:
(V' = F) (F' = V)
These expressions may be affected by a factor between 0 and 1, the following relations being satisfied:
which is the interpretation of classical logic. But we could establish an intuitionistic logic and not give the double negation as true and admit that we do not know whether it is true or false. Formally,
((x/F)/F = x/(∈{VF))
For finite expressions the PTE holds, which applies to all kinds of expressions, not just logical ones: an expression either exists or it does not exist.
〈(θ ←' x? → α )〉
The evaluation of an expression using the operator "?" is the null expression (θ) or the existential expression (α). For example,
For infinite expressions this is also true, as long as there are descriptive operators. For example,
({2 4 ...} ⊂ {1...})? // ev. α
(the set of even numbers are included in the set of natural numbers)
Conclusions
MENTAL harmonizes classical logic and intuitionistic logic:
MENTAL is both formalist (uses a formal language) and intuitionist (uses universal intuitive concepts). The "construction" in MENTAL is both linguistic (formal) and mental (conceptual).
"True" and "false" are equivalent to "existence" and "non-existence", respectively. which apply to all kinds of expressions.
Actually, the concepts of "true" and "false" are superfluous and are also ambiguous and can lead to confusion. The concepts of existence and non-existence are sufficient for us. If we want to use the symbolism V-F, we can define (V =: α) y (F =: θ). That is, V represents existence and F non-existence.
MENTAL is a universal formal language that allows the expression of different logics: propositional, predicative, polyvalent, fuzzy, modal, intensional, intuitionistic, etc. A logic can be created that has mixed characteristics: intuitionistic fuzzy logic, intuitionistic modal logic, intuitionistic fuzzy modal logic, or any imaginary logic.
At the deep level, there is only one logic: the one based on the primitive "Condition". The different logics are only applications of MENTAL. By means of the universal language you can define and use the most appropriate logic in each case.
Brouwer's logic is conceptual. Heyting's logic is formal, but it is of unnecessary complexity. It can be considered an imaginary logic. It is an interesting theoretical exercise, but of little practical use.
Intuitionistic logic is not true logic. True logic is one, fixed and absolute, because it is founded on a primary archetype (the Condition) and on the concept of existence or non-existence of an expression. This primary archetype is as fixed and absolute as that of set or sequence. In the same way that it makes no sense to develop alternative (or more abstract) concepts to set or sequence because that would imply a loss of some concepts that are essential.
Addenda
Intuitionism and conceptualism
Intuitionism is a gnoseological theory according to which intuition is the only way to know reality. True reality resides in the deep and can only be grasped by intuition.
For Plato, the soul directly grasps the reality of the eternal ideas through intuition, which is the most perfect form of knowledge. Plato is the father of intuitionism.
For Kant, intuition is characterized as eminently active and creative.
For Bergson, intuition is immediate consciousness and introduces us to the essence of Being; intuition is the only way for the construction of metaphysics.
For Husserl, eidetic intuition (from eidos, idea) is perfect knowledge, an apprehension of the essence of things.
Intuitionism is different from conceptualism, the philosophical school that claims that universals, abstractions, and ideas are entities that exist only in the human mind.
Constructivism and idealism
Constructivism is a theory of knowledge based on 3 principles: 1) Knowledge is not received passively, but is actively constructed by the cognizing subject; 2) The process of cognition is adaptive in the sense that it serves to internally organize the experiential world and not to discover external ontological reality; 3) Mental contents have no relation to "truth", understood as correspondence between internal and external world.
In mathematics, Gödel's theorem establishes limits to truth, but in constructivism there are no limitations.
In linguistics, the receiver constructs meanings on the basis of his inner universe.
In literature, meanings are not in the texts. Readers construct the meanings.
In cybernetics, systems actively and adaptively self-regulate internally.
In psychology, human beings have access only to the sensations and operations of the mind with which they construct their inner world. "Intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself" (Piaget).
Constructivism was born with Giambattista Vico: truth is what man comes to know by constructing through his actions. The human being can only know a thing that he himself creates. "Verum ipsum factum" (Truth is doing). What we create, is determined by our previous constructions. Knowledge is internal, mental constructivism. Vico was an epistemological innovator.
Until Kant, the subject was considered passive in the act of knowing; the subject had to subordinate itself to the object in order to know it. With Kant, the subject is active; it is the object that has to subordinate itself to the subject in the act of knowing. Kant uses the expression "transcendental idealism" to distinguish himself from Berkeley's radical subjective idealism. Human knowledge can only refer to the phenomenon and not to the noun (the thing in itself). In the experience of knowledge, the human psyche is determinant in the knowledge of the object. The construction of reality is determined by the categories of thought and the a priori intuitions of space and time. Metaphysics can be interpreted through epistemology, since we can address metaphysical problems by understanding the source and limits of knowledge.
Radical constructivism was founded by Heinz Von Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld. For Von Foerster, the nervous system does not distinguish between perception and allusionation (today we say that the brain does not distinguish between the real and the imagined).
Idealism is a philosophical doctrine that gives primacy to ideas. The object of knowledge is not reality itself, but the representation of reality in our mind (ideas).
For objective idealism, ideas exist by themselves and we can only apprehend them by sensible experience. For subjective idealism, ideas exist only in the mind of the subject. For radical subjective idealism, reality is only mental.
For George Berkeley, radical subjective idealist, reality is nothing but a collection of ideas in our mind. The external world is only an idea in the spirit of God. We only know what we perceive. There are no abstract concepts.
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